浙江工商大学学报

2016, 02, No.137 102-110

多个大股东与公司治理研究

基金项目(Foundation): 国家自然科学基金项目“基于策略互动实验方法的大股东控制权私利形成机理研究:影响因素与伦理决策”(71272143);; 浙江省社科规划项目“合规治理、家族控制、长远战略:代际传承背景下浙江家族企业董事会治理有效性问题研究”(15JDZS01Z);; 浙江省自然科学基金项目“基于制度合法性与行为有效性相结合的上市公司董事会治理有效性研究以及浙江实证”(Y16G020007)

邮箱(Email):

DOI: 10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1337/c.2016.02.013

发布时间： 2016-03-15

出版时间： 2016-03-15

移动端阅读

1,126	45	32
下载次数	被引频次	阅读次数

引用本文下载本文

PDF

引用导出

GB/T 7714-2015 MLA APA Refworks EndNote NoteExpress NoteFirst

摘要全文参考文献出版信息相关文章

摘要：

本研究围绕多个大股东结构下的大股东与公司治理问题,对多个大股东存在的现象、大股东之间的股权制衡、大股东关系进行了系统回顾与评述。我们发现,多个大股东结构下股权制衡失效的原因首先是对"大股东关系"认知的混淆,相应地,关注微观主体特别是第二大股东的治理作用也成为研究股权制衡的有效切入点。

关键词： 多个大股东; 股权制衡; 大股东关系;

Abstract：

On the subject of large shareholders and corporate governance under multiple shareholders structure,this paper conducts a systematic review and comments on the multiple large shareholders,the check-and-balance ownership between them and the relation between them. The results show that firstly,the reason of imbalance of the check-and-balance ownership in the multiple large shareholder structure is the cognitive confusion of "relationship of large shareholders"; secondly,consideration of the governance of microcosmic body,particularly the second-largest shareholder is an effective breakthrough point to balance the check-and-balance ownership.

KeyWords： multiple large shareholders; check-and-balance ownership; large shareholder relations;

如需获取全文，请访问cnki.net

参考文献

[1]PAGANO M,ROELL A.The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure:Agency Costs,Monitoring,and the Decision to Go Public[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,113(1):187-225.

[2]GOMESA,NOVAES W.Sharing of Control versus Monitoring[EB/OL].(2005-02-01)[2015-12-04].http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=277111.

[3]MANCINELLI L,OZKAN A.Ownership Structure and Dividend Policy:Evidence from Italian Firms[J].European Journal of Finance,2006,12(3):265-282.

[4]魏明海,黄琼宇,程敏英.家族企业关联大股东的治理角色——基于关联交易的视角[J].管理世界,2013(3):133-147.

[5]李学伟,马忠.金字塔结构下多个控制性大股东的制衡效应[J].中国软科学,2007(7):62-70.

[6]JENSEN M,MECKLING W.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs,and Ownership Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.

[7]FAMA E F,JENSEN M C.Separation of Ownership and Control[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983,7(26):301-325.

[8]DENIS D K,MCCONNELL J J.International Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003,38(1):1-36.

[9]SHLEIFER A,VISHNY R W.A Survey of Corporate Governance[J].The Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):737-783.

[10]CLAESSENS S,DJANKOV S,FAN J P H,et al.Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings[J].The Journal of Finance,2002,57(6):2741-2771.

[11]LAPORTA R,LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F,SHLEIFER A.Corporate Ownership around the World[J].The Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):471-517.

[12]THILLAINATHAN R.A Review of Corporate Governance in Malaysia[J].Banker's Journal Malaysia,1999,109:23-55.

[13]FACCIO M,LANG L H P.The Ultimate Ownership of Western European Corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2002,65(3):365-395.

[14]MAURY B,PAJUSTE A.Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm Value[J].Journal of Banking and Finance,2005,29(7):1813-1834.

[15]BELOT F.Shareholder Agreements and Firm Value:Evidence From French Listed Firms[EB/OL].(2010-09-01)[2015-12-04].http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1282144.

[16]俞红海,徐龙炳.股权集中下的控股股东侵占与公司治理综述[J].经济管理,2011(10):127-134.

[17]BETHEL J E,LIEBESKIND J P,OPLER T.Block Share Purchases and Corporate Performance[J].Journal of Finance,1998,2(53):605-634.

[18]DHILLON A,ROSSETTO S.Corporate Control and Multiple Large Shareholders[EB/OL].(2006-03-19)[2015-12-04].http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=891548.

[19]SHLEIFER A,VISHNY R W.Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(3):461-488.

[20]LAEVEN L,LEVINE R.Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations[J].Review of Financial Studies,2008,21(2):579-604.

[21]BENNEDSEN M,WOLFENZON D.The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58(1):113-139.

[22]GUTIRREZ I,TRIBJ A.Private Benefits Extraction in Closely Held Corporations:The Case for Multiple Large Shareholders[EB/OL].(2004-09-15)[2015-12-04].http://orff.uc3m.es/bitstream/handle/10016/427/wb044315.pdf?sequence=1.

[23]SANTOS M S,MOREIRA A C,VIEIRA E S.Governance with Complex Structures:Evidence from Western European Countries[J].Journal of Business Economics and Management,2015,16(3):542-557.

[24]LEHMANN E,WEIGAND J.Does the Governed Corporation Perform Better?Governance Structures and Corporate Performance in Germany[J].European Finance Review,2000,4(2):157-195.

[25]EDMANS A,MANSO G.Governance through Trading and Intervention:A Theory of Multiple Blockholders[J].Review of Financial Studies,2011,24(7):2395-2428.

[26]朱红军,汪辉.“股权制衡”可以改善公司治理吗?——宏智科技股份有限公司控制权之争的案例研究[J].管理世界,2004(10):114-123.

[27]梁杰,王璇,李进中.现代公司治理结构与会计舞弊关系的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2004(6):47-51.

[28]BOLTON P,THADDEN V.Blocks,Liquidity,and Corporate Control[J].The Journal of Finance,1998,53(1):1-25.

[29]JARA-BERTN M,LPEZ-ITURRIAGA F J,LPEZ-DE-FORONDA.The Contest to the Control in European Family Firms:How Other Shareholders Affect Firm Value[J].Corporate Governance:An International Review,2008,16(3):146-159.

[30]刘星,刘伟.监督,抑或共谋?——我国上市公司股权结构与公司价值的关系研究[J].会计研究,2007(6):68-75.

[31]魏明海,程敏英,郑国坚.从股权结构到股东关系[J].会计研究,2011(1):60-67.

[32]程敏英,魏明海.关系股东的权力超额配置[J].中国工业经济,2013(10):108-120.

[33]蔡宁,魏明海,陆晓燕.股东关系与“大小非”减持中的股东合谋[D].广州:中山大学管理学院,2010.

[34]VOLPIN P F.Governance with Poor Investor Protection:Evidence from Top Executive Turnover in Italy[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2002,64(1):61-90.

[35]SNCHEZ M J N,RODRGUEZ Z F,MARTNEZ M J C,et al.Impacto de la Implicación Familiar y de Otros Accionistas de Referencia en la Creación de Valor[J].Revista de Estudios Empresariales,2009,2(2):5-20.

[36]赵旸.非比例控制下大股东间控制权竞争一基于股改前后我国上市公司权益成本的实证分析[D].大连:东北财经大学金融学院,2012.

[37]HAMZAH A H,ZULKAFLI A H.Multiple Shareholders Structure(MSS)and Corporate Financial Policy[J].Journal of Finance,2014,2(1):107-134.

[38]张瑞稳,孟婧,戴立平.第二大股东对股利政策影响的实证研究[J].经济与管理研究,2007(10):25-30.

[39]涂国前,刘峰.制衡股东性质与制衡效果——来自中国民营化上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界,2010(11):132-142.

[40]LA PORTA R,LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F,SHLEIFER A.Government Ownership of Banks[J].The Journal of Finance,2002,57(1):265-301.

[41]BLOCH F,HEGE U.Multiple Shareholders and Control Contests[EB/OL].(2003-09-29)[2015-12-04].http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2273211.

[42]李学伟,马忠.金字塔结构下多个控制性大股东的制衡效应[J].中国软科学,2007(7):62-70.

[43]张旭辉,黄雷.多个大股东股权结构对股权代理成本的影响[J].开发研究,2012(5):93-97.

[44]申尊焕,郑秋亚.上市公司第一大股东控制权:一个模型分析[J].统计与决策,2007(24):127-129.

[45]WANG Q,WONG T J,XIA L.State Ownership,The Institutional Environment,and Auditor Choice:Evidence from China[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2008,46(1):112-134.

[46]LA PORTA R,LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F,SHLEIFER A,et al.Investor Protection and Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58(1):3-27.

[47]关鑫,齐晓飞.上市公司股东间合作机制构建研究[J].中国工业经济,2015(2):115-127.

基本信息:

DOI：10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1337/c.2016.02.013

中图分类号:F275;F271

引用信息:

[1]郝云宏,汪茜,王淑贤.多个大股东与公司治理研究[J].浙江工商大学学报,2016,No.137(02):102-110.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1337/c.2016.02.013.

基金信息:

国家自然科学基金项目“基于策略互动实验方法的大股东控制权私利形成机理研究:影响因素与伦理决策”(71272143);; 浙江省社科规划项目“合规治理、家族控制、长远战略:代际传承背景下浙江家族企业董事会治理有效性问题研究”(15JDZS01Z);; 浙江省自然科学基金项目“基于制度合法性与行为有效性相结合的上市公司董事会治理有效性研究以及浙江实证”(Y16G020007)

发布时间：

2016-03-15

出版时间：

2016-03-15

请选择需要下载的pdf数据

浙江工商大学学报

使用微信“扫一扫”功能。
将此内容分享给您的微信好友或者朋友圈

引用

GB/T 7714-2015 格式引文

MLA格式引文

APA格式引文

请选择需要下载的pdf数据

浙江工商大学学报

使用微信“扫一扫”功能。将此内容分享给您的微信好友或者朋友圈

引用

使用微信“扫一扫”功能。
将此内容分享给您的微信好友或者朋友圈