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文章通过对2003年成立的Q机构的历时研究,从组织生命周期视角描述分析Q机构董事会的治理实践与变化,发现机构董事会的功能以及权力格局都随着组织发展而变动。董事会在早期阶段主要起到非正式督导的作用,在重要决策上受到个别董事及外部官员影响,董事会运作呈现以人际沟通为主的非正式性;在发展中期阶段,董事会成员对组织发展的方向产生分歧,董事会干预机构的日常运营与具体管理人员任免,董事与执行层产生矛盾;在组织发展转型阶段,董事会规模变大,结构日益多元化,董事会运作也日益正式化与程序化。早期起到重要影响的董事被边缘化,影响力被削弱,导致新的权力格局形成。董事会理念发生重大变化,从之前强调服务的专业化转向强调服务的经济效益取向。该研究发现,董事会在实践中很难做到理性治理,决策往往存在妥协,尤其会受个别积极董事的理念影响。董事会在整个生命周期内呈现出均衡-冲突-均衡的发展历程。
Abstract：Through the diachronic study of the Q organization established in 2003,this study describes the development and changes of the board from the perspective of the organization's life cycle,and finds that the functions and power of the board of directors are changing with the development of the organization. The early board of directors,to some extent,played an informal supervision role,influenced by individual directors and external officials in important decisions. In the middle stage of development,the board members had disagreement and contradictions on the direction of the organizational development,the Board intervenedin daily operation and the appointment and removal of the specific managers. In the stage of organizational development and transformation,the size of the board of directors became larger,the structure was increasingly diversified,and the operation of the board of directors was increasingly formalized and programmed. The directors who were important in the early days were marginalized and their influence was weakening,which led to the formation of a new power structure. The concept of the board of directors changed greatly,from the previous emphasis on the specialization of service to the emphasis on the economic benefit orientation of the service. The study found that it was difficult for the board of directors to achieve rational governance in practice,and decision-making was often compromised and influenced by the concept of individual active directors. The board of directors presented a development processof‘balance-conflict-equilibrium' throughout the life cycle.
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(1)一年以后,主任A辞职,因而也离开董事会,由另外一位名叫FJ的注册会计师接替。这样董事会结构基本上形成了一个惯例——P社工协会派3名代表,外加董事S与董事Y构成。
(1)事实是当时由于资金紧张,政府答应的项目资金迟迟不能到账,主任A将自己的钱贴进项目,用于发工资等,但由于机构没有专职财务,在财务记录上并没有详细反映。
(2)董事S、董事Y、董事长W在访谈中都表达对主任A离职的可惜之情。但是,当时的审计事件,主任A也认为受到极大伤害,在不被董事会信任的情况下,她也不愿意继续做下去。(参见主任A访谈,编号:20161208)
(1)在访谈中,董事Y说话最直接,她认为董事会决策都是官员M在起作用,说“都是M的意见……W也是M找来的,他听她的。”(参见董事Y访谈,编号:20161128)董事S对于两件事情都表达比较谨慎隐晦,都说“我也不太晓得怎么回事。”“我也不好说其他董事怎么样。”(参见董事S访谈,编号:20161220)
(1)在访谈调查中,董事L也提到了主任D与董事会之间的矛盾;但是在与董事S与董事Y的访谈中,他们并不承认与执行层之间有矛盾,他们认为与执行主任虽然有争执,但是他们都认为自己的出发点是好的。
(1)主任E是2009年作为主任助理进入Q工作的,她曾经在企业中工作数年,人力资源管理专业背景。在主任D因为身体原因离职时,董事会认为E并不完全具备独立领导的能力,因而先暂为代理主任,与其他三位副主任共同负责管理Q机构。
(2)F曾任某大型企业的副总裁,退休后在2012年由董事L邀请加入Q董事会,2015年后代理主任一职。
(3)董事Y在“授权”事件发生后,认为自己已经失去在董事会中存在的价值与意义,因而于2016年提出退出董事会。董事S也表示自己就真的成了一年参加一次董事会会议的董事。
(4)董事Y退出了董事会,只有董事S一人是最初的参与者,其余六位董事都是新的成员。
(5)特别是在对现职工作管理人员的访谈中,他们一般给出的是正面评价,如项目增多、工作人员的薪水增加等。
(6)董事Y对于Q机构区域化管理的做法直接持否定态度,认为他们的方向不对,在管理上也不适合社会服务机构。
(7)董事X是香港的资深社工,是董事S于2004年为Q机构提供的督导资源,2016年董事Y退出后,机构邀请X作为专家董事进入董事会。
(8)董事S和董事X并没有持明确反对的态度,但是,通过访谈分析,他们虽然认为社会服务组织可以用商业的方法和理念来进行运作,但是,也担心商业的方法和理念会侵蚀社会服务组织的利他价值观。
基本信息:
DOI：10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1337/c.2019.03.012
中图分类号:C912.2
引用信息:
[1]聂玉梅,顾东辉.生命周期视角下非营利组织的董事会治理实践研究——以Q社工机构为个案[J].浙江工商大学学报,2019,No.156(03):109-120.DOI:10.14134/j.cnki.cn33-1337/c.2019.03.012.
基金信息:
浙江省哲学社会科学规划课题“社会服务组织培育的绩效评估研究——基于浙江实践的考察”(19NDJC228YB);; 杭州市哲学社会科学规划课题“制度改革背景下社会组织项目制治理研究”(G18JC022);; 浙江省民政政策理论研究规划课题“浙江省社会组织孵化培育绩效研究”(ZMJF201824)
2019-05-15
2019-05-15