浙江工商大学学报

刷单炒信已演变为与平台经济共生的违法现象，产业化发展使其运作更为隐蔽、场景加速蔓延，法经济学视角的引入有助于破解治理困境。平台信用评价体系在发挥声誉机制作用、平衡网络交易信息不对称的同时，其特殊的规则设计也创生了刷单炒信的利益空间。当前针对刷单炒信的规制包括私权救济、平台自治、公共规制等多种路径，但整体仍存在惩罚效果有限、查处概率系统性不足的问题。结合博弈论的分析则表明，提升查处能力、重构监管激励才是长效治理的关键。对此，建议未来从查处概率、违法收益和违法成本三个维度着手，强化多元共治框架、健全信用评价机制和完善惩罚体系设计，以重塑刷单炒信行为的动机与情境，最终实现有效治理。

The practice of fake transactions and fraudulent reviews has increasingly evolved into an illegal phenomenon symbiotic with the platform economy. Its industrialization has rendered its operations more covert and accelerated its spread across various scenarios. Introducing a law and economics perspective helps address the governance dilemma. While the platform credit rating system functions as a reputational mechanism to mitigate information asymmetry in online transactions, its specific design features also create profit opportunities for such fraudulent practices. Current regulatory approaches include private remedies, platform self-governance, and public regulation. However, overall, they suffer from limited punitive effects and a systematically insufficient probability of detection. Game-theoretic analysis further suggests that enhancing detection capacity and restructuring regulatory incentives are the keys to long-term governance. Accordingly, future efforts should focus on three dimensions: detection probability, illegal gains, and illegal costs. Specifically, this entails strengthening a multi-stakeholder governance framework, improving credit rating mechanisms, and refining the design of the sanction system, so as to reshape the incentives and contexts underlying these fraudulent practices and ultimately achieve effective governance.